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EXPERIMENTING WITH TERRITORIALITY:
PAN-EUROPEAN MUSIC LICENSE AND THE
PERSISTENCE OF OLD PARADIGMS
ANA EDUARDA SANTOS 1

ABSTRACT
This article tells the story of what could have been an
interesting and important shift in our approach to territoriality in
the digitalized world. Europe had the chance to be the cradle of an
unprecedented copyright experience – the creation of a quasi pancontinental license in the music field – but it might have lost that
opportunity in the midst of non-binding recommendations and
resolutions. This article argues this loss is due to the overreaching
persistence of old paradigms, namely the principle of territoriality.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
In May 2004, the European Commission announced the opening of
proceedings regarding collective licensing of music copyrights for online
use, issuing a statement where it recognized that “the loss of territoriality
brought about by the Internet, as well as the digital format of products such
as music files, are difficult to reconcile with traditional copyright licensing
schemes, which are based on purely national procedures.” 2 This article
focuses on the 2005 Recommendation on Collective Cross-Border
Management of Copyright and Related Rights for Legitimate Online Music
Services, the first-ever formal act from a European Institution to address
these problems and to attempt to smooth the territoriality principle that has
characterized – and obstructed – the relationships between rights-holders,
collective management rights societies, and commercial users. In order to
properly understand the meaning and weight that should be accorded to the
Recommendation, this article first gives a brief overview of the recent
evolution of the online music market in the European Union, followed by a
1

LLM 2008, SJD candidate, Duke Law School, with some comments and
contributions by Leonardo Cervera Navas as EU Fellow at Duke University
(2007–2008). The author would like to thank Mr. Cervera Navas for his helpful
comments and support. All the opinions expressed in this document are personal
and in no way represent the views of the European Commission or Duke
University. All errors and mistakes remains my own,
2
Press Release, Europa, Commission Opens Proceedings into Collective
Licensing of Music Copyrights for Online Use (May 3, 2004), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/586.
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general outline of the dynamics of music licensing from the perspective of
collective rights management societies.
¶2
After dissecting the Commission’s Recommendation, this article
tracks some of the post-2005 developments that were either stimulated by or
reacted against the Recommendation, including the monitoring carried out
by the Commission in 2007. The article concludes with a brief analysis of
the March 2007 European Parliament Non-Legislative Resolution on the
Recommendation.

I. THE PARADOX
¶3
Europe has been experimenting with territoriality since the middle
of the 20th century, when the treaty founding the European Commission
was signed. 3 Since then, each one of its Member States has progressively
lost elements of its sovereignty, in a process that smoothened the European
Union’s internal frontiers, until it reached a point where people and goods
benefited from a general “freedom” of moving, living, working and trading
in different countries. 4 However, as Hugenholtz et alia point out, “the
harmonization process [in Europe] has left largely intact a more serious
impediment to the creation of an internal market: the territorial nature of
copyright and related rights.” 5
¶4
A natural question thus emerges: is it the nature of copyright that is
blocking the harmonization process, or is the harmonization process itself
flawed and therefore fails to set copyright free from its old territorial
chains? Hugenholtz believes that the right answer implies both theories:
“[i]ndeed, for as long as the territorial nature of copyright and related rights
is left intact, harmonization can achieve very little;”6 on the other hand, “the
EU legislature has been aiming . . . at the wrong target.” 7 The
harmonization process is paradoxical: it is convergent when it gives away
more rights and a broadens protection, but that “upwards” attitude has
detrimental effects in the internal market. It creates a plethora of

3

See generally Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321E) 37, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/ce321/ce32120061229en00010331.pd
f [hereinafter EC Treaty].
4
See generally id. at 57.
5
BERNT HUGENHOLTZ ET AL., INST. FOR INFO. LAW, THE RECASTING OF
COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS FOR THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 22 (2006),
available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/studies/etd2005imd195recast
_report_2006.pdf.
6
Id.
7
Id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2940859
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microscopic rights diffused at the national level, thus impairing the free
movement of goods and services. 8
¶5
As the following section will show, the advent of online music
businesses should have been enough of an incentive for Europe to
reconsider its copyright licensing scheme.

A. The Online Music Market
¶6
For the purposes of this article, the “online music market” will be
defined as “any music service provided on the Internet such as simulcasting,
webcasting, streaming, downloading, online ‘on-demand’ service or
provided to mobile telephones.” 9
¶7
Although the downloading of online music is a flourishing business
in the entire Western world, Europe is particularly attractive because its
market took off later than the North American market and is likely to
experience unprecedented growth rates in the coming years. The following
tables show the results of a comparative study between the markets in the
United States and the European Union (the numbers for the years 2005
through 2008 are projections). 10 While both markets show the same
tendency to grow at a fast pace, the ratio of total downloads and
subscriptions in 2005 to the total in 2008 in the United States was expected
to grow 2.5 times, whereas in Europe that number was as high as 5.2. But if
we consider the time span of 2004 to 2008, 11 the United States’ ratio was 6,
while Europe’s was 20, which means at the time the European Commission
first became interested in the problem of cross-border management of
digital rights, Europe was on the verge of an explosion.

8

Id. at 30.
Comm’n of the European Cmtys., Commission Staff Working Document: Study
on a Community Initiative on the Cross-Border Collective Management of
Copyright 6 (July 7, 2005), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/management/studycollectivemgmt_en.pdf [hereinafter Working Document].
10
See BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, DRM-ENABLED ONLINE CONTENT SERVICES
IN EUROPE AND THE USA 3 (2005).
11
2004 is the last year actual data was available. The European Institutions have
since based their multi-territorial management decisions on these numbers.
9
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Online Music Market, USA 12

Online Music Market, Western Europe 13

¶8
If we consider the ratio of total downloads and subscriptions in
2005 to the total in 2008 in countries where major collective rights
management societies operate, such as the United Kingdom, Germany,
France and Italy, we find numbers that range from 4.1, in the UK, to an
expressive 7.4, in Italy.

Online Music Market, UK 14

Online Music Market, Germany 15

12

BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, supra note 10, at 5.
Id. at 4.
14
Id. at 7.
15
Id. at 12.
13
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Online Music Market, France 16

Online Music Market, Italy 17

¶9
In smaller countries, where collective management societies are
either deficient or less developed, the numbers show the same ascending
tendency. Take the example of Portugal where, although collective
management exists, they are not compulsory by law, and where the ratio of
total downloads and subscriptions in 2005 to the total in 2008 exceeds 6.6, a
number that places the country on the same level as France.

Online Music Market, Portugal 18

¶10
Finally, the same pattern applies in an even more explosive way to
the ten Member States that joined the European Union in 2004: between
2004 and 2005 their ratio was 3, but if we look to the period comprised
between 2005 and 2008, then the numbers increase to 19.88.

16

Id. at 16.
Id. at 36.
18
BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, supra note 10, at 41.
17
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Online Music Market, New Member States 19

As of today, the numbers available confirm the projection of the
studies the Commission used while framing the problem of transnational
music licensing, and similar growth patterns are expected over the next few
years 20 .
¶11

¶12
While reviewing this data, the Commission Staff framed its own
role as a fixing task: “For 2005, online music revenue is expected to rise to
€ 106.4 million within Western Europe, while the US revenue will forge
ahead to € 498.3 million. This gap between U.S. and Western European
online music revenue needs to be redressed.” 21 And while the Commission
left some room for the possibility of other factors contributing to this gap, 22
it mainly held the structure of existing collecting societies liable for
Europe’s lower numbers.

B. Collective Rights Management Societies in Europe
¶13
“[M]ost . . . collective rights management societies currently derive
their existence from rights granted or entrusted to them on a national
(territorial) basis.” 23

19

Id. at 4.
See European Music Download Forecast: 2006 to 2011 by Rebecca
Jennings—Forrester Research,
http://www.forrester.com/Research/Document/Excerpt/0,7211,38733,00.html
(last visited Aug. 21, 2009) (stating the number of legal downloads via computer
or mobile telephone is expected to grow 36% between 2006 and 2011).
21
Working Document, supra note 9, at 6.
22
See Working Document, supra note 9, at 6 n.6 (“Some argue that the principal
hindrance to revenue growth in online music services is the widespread use of
illegal peer-to-peer networks to share electronic music files, the lack of
interoperability and consumer acceptance. Whilst these are contributory factors
in each area, especially in the case [sic] P2P file sharing, efforts are being made
separately either at a legislative level (Directive on Enforcement) or by market
initiatives on greater interoperability.”).
23
HUGENHOLTZ ET AL., supra note 5, at 22.
20
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The somewhat fragmentary model according to which a cloud of
collecting societies has been operating in the European Union does bring
some benefits to both consumers and rights-holders. Hugenholtz’s study
has identified at least two territoriality-related positive effects: 24 cultural
diversity and economic efficiency. Cultural diversity is a consequence of
collecting societies naturally protecting and promoting local authors and
performers. 25 Economic efficiency happens – or may happen – because
“[t]erritoriality makes it easier for right holders to define, and split up,
markets along national borders, and set different prices and conditions for
identical products or services in different Member States.” 26 Nonetheless,
there is a relevant drawback to this function: “such price discrimination”
and “such uses of intellectual property are fundamentally at odds with the
goal of achieving an internal market.” 27
¶14

Following the first steps taken in 2004 towards an assessment of the
performance of the several collective rights management societies operating
in the Union and the breadth of the online music licensing market, the
European Commission chose to focus a large part of its analysis on an
efficiency evaluation. The Commission concluded that collecting societies
across the Union present different levels of efficiency (see graphic below)
and that, as a whole, they are prevented from addressing the geographic-free
necessities of consumers and rights-holders by several factors, the primary
one being the territorial barriers to their expansion. 28

¶15

24

Id. at 23.
Id. Interestingly, the European Commission will argue that the exact opposite
model – promoting collecting societies with pan-European mandates – is
actually the option that better suits cultural diversity, because it forces collecting
societies to compete among themselves and competition will lead some of them
to specialize in niche markets in order to survive. See Working Document, supra
note 9, at 29.
26
HUGENHOLTZ ET AL., supra note 5, at 23.
27
Id.
28
Working Document, supra note 9, at 9–10.
25
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Collective right management societies are not equally efficient in the
cross-border collection and distribution of revenues 29

Notice in particular the transversal negative growth rates in the
revenues from affiliated societies. 30 Although it stands alone on this trend,
Spain’s SGAE also presents a strong decrease in the payments made to
foreign societies (-13.12%), a phenomenon that is particularly interesting
when linked to the fact that it has the highest growth in total revenues
among Europe’s largest collecting societies.

¶16

In addition to this irregular internal pattern, the Commission Staff
found that the existence of collective rights management entities spread
around Europe but operating on a mono-territorial basis was the source of
considerable static and dynamic efficiency. “The current practice of
collective management of copyright on a national territorial basis requires
each collective rights manager to cooperate with others in the other
territories, if a commercial user’s service is accessible in another territory.
In practice, this means that a commercial user requires a license from each
and every relevant collective rights manager in each territory of the EU in
which the work is accessible.” 31

¶17

29

Working Document, supra note 9, at 27 tbl.4.
Affiliated societies are precisely the ones the Commission’s proposal will seek
to eliminate, because of their “middle-man” quality. An affiliated society is the
entity that enters into reciprocal agreements with foreign management societies
when copyrighted works are available in other territories, thus being able to
commercially exploit the foreign repertoire in its own territory. See id. at 28.
31
Working Document, supra note 9, at 8 (emphasis added).
30
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This practice poses two problems: first, not all collective rights
management societies have entered into bilateral representation agreements,
which means that Europe has a pierced network and there is “no seamless
system that covers the aggregate EU repertoire for any type of right or any
form of exploitation;” 32 and second, the cooperation between collecting
societies is made through reciprocal representation agreements, 33 the
numbers of which can rise to astronomic levels if a collective rights
manager wants to have Europe-wide coverage. The Commission Staff did
its math and concluded that:
¶18

In order for these reciprocal representation agreements to cover at
least the aggregate repertoire of all European collective rights
managers for one particular form of exploitation of one particular
right (e.g. the public performance right used in a streaming
services) in all European territories, by way of example, it is
necessary that European collective rights managers conclude
among themselves a minimum of 300 bilateral reciprocal
representation agreements. This is based on the hypothesis that
there would be a minimum of 25 collective rights managers per
category of right on each Member State, each manager has to have
a reciprocal representation agreement with the 24 other managers.
In order to determine the total number of bilateral combinations
necessary among 25 European collective rights manager, the
number of combinations of k (=2) out of n (=25). This can be
determined according to the following formula: 34

¶19
Given these practical constraints, most national collective rights
management societies tend to enter into alliances that facilitate transnational

32

Id. at 9.
The Commission Staff notes that “[t]he term ‘reciprocal’ in the context of
these private agreements means ‘in return for of an identical grant.’ It does not
connote ‘reciprocity’ for which there is a specific meaning in international law
especially in the international copyright conventions i.e. where rights are granted
by one country to its nationals, the nationals of another country can only have
the benefit of those rights where there is commensurate recognition of these
rights by the other country.” Id. n. 10.
34
Id. at 8. A quick aside: something is deeply wrong when someone has to resort to
a formula to figure out this number; a number that is per se frightening in a regional
system whose primary economical goal is to establish and strengthen an internal
market.
33
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management of digital rights, 35 but nonetheless present an important
drawback. The model agreements and the bilateral reciprocal representation
agreements “concluded pursuant to . . . [these alliances] apply a series of
restrictions which are contrary to the fundamental EU principle that
services, including collective management of copyright or individual
services associated with the collective management of copyright, should be
provided across national borders without restriction based on nationality,
residence, [or] place of establishment.” 36 The consistency of these
restrictions with the principles of European unfair trading law has not yet
been analyzed by the European Court of Justice. However, in the case of
Ministère Public v. Tournier, 37 where the owners of a discotheque
complained that SACEM was charging them an excessive fee, the court
held that charging higher royalties in one State when compared to another
was a violation of unfair trading law. 38 Nevertheless, the court did say that
such discrimination might be permissible under objective and relevant
reasons. 39 If the same reasoning was to apply to the bilateral reciprocal
35

See e.g., International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers,
http://www.cisac.org (follow “CISAC and Authors’ Rights” tab) (last visited
Aug. 21, 2009); Bureau International des Sociétés Gérant les Droits
d'Enregistrement et de Reproduction Mécanique,
http://www.biem.org/content.aspx?PageId=122&CountryId=0&SocietyId=0
(last visited Aug. 21, 2009); Societies' Council for the Collective Management
of Performers' Rights, http://www.scapr.org (last visited Aug. 21, 2009).
36
Working Document, supra note 9, at 9.
37
Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Aix-en-Provence, July 13, 1989,
ECR 1989, 2521 (Fr.), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61987J0395:EN:HTML.
38

See EC Treaty, supra note 3 at Art. 82 (“Any abuse by one or more
undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a
substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common
market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. Such abuse may,
in particular, consist in: (a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or
selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; (b) limiting production, markets
or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; (c) applying dissimilar
conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing
them at a competitive disadvantage; (d) making the conclusion of contracts
subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which,
by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the
subject of such contracts.”).

39

Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Aix-en-Provence, July 13, 1989,
ECR 1989, 2521, 46 (Fr.) (“Article 86 of the Treaty must be interpreted as
meaning that a national copyright-management society holding a dominant
position in a substantial part of the Common Market imposes unfair trading
conditions where the royalties which it charges to discothèques are appreciably
higher than those charged in other Member States, the rates being compared on a
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agreements, this would be yet another case where competition rules are
applied to rescue copyright holders, which is a frequent scenario in Europe.
However, the Tournier case was decided in 1989, when the Internet
had not yet acquired its instantaneous and global qualities. It is therefore
arguable that today there will be much less “objective” or “relevant”
grounds for restrictions that are territorial in nature.

¶20

The Commission Staff has summarized the current panorama of
transnational management of music-related rights in the following scheme,
concluding that “the core service elements ‘cross-border grant of licenses to
commercial users’ and ‘cross-border distribution of royalties’ do not
function in an optimal manner and hamper the development of an
innovative market for the provision of online music services.” 40
¶21

Overview of the potential cross-border services that are currently
prevented by the structure of reciprocal agreements among collecting
rights managers 41

consistent basis. That would not be the case if the copyright-management
society in question were able to justify such a difference by reference to
objective and relevant dissimilarities between copyright management in the
Member State concerned and copyright management in the other Member
States.” (emphasis added)).
40
Working Document, supra note 9, at 9.
41
Id. at 29.
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In the eyes of the Commission Staff, this rather complicated (and,
above all, costly and time-consuming) scheme for cross-border licensing
raises three major concerns: territorial restrictions to copyright licensing,
discrimination in cross-border distribution of royalties and the existence of
membership rules that may restrict cross-border provision of services.
¶22

Summary of main problems with cross-border collective management
of copyright for legitimate online music services 42

¶23
The Commission therefore sets a general goal to be achieved in the
near future. This goal, in the Commission’s words, is “the opening up of
Europe’s large and mainly unexploited potential growth in legitimate online
services,” a desideratum that the Commission links to today’s lack of
confidence of right-holders in the current cross-border management
system. 43 These goals would be backed up by changes at the so-called
“specific” and “operational” levels, as the following chart illustrates:

42
43

Id. at 11.
Id. at 31.
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Summary of the problems and goals to be achieved 44

II. THE MAY 18, 2005 RECOMMENDATION: THE DESIGN
¶24
The 2005 Commission Recommendation on Collective CrossBorder Management of Copyright and Related Rights for Legitimate Online
Music Services 45 (hereinafter referred to as the Recommendation) is
addressed to the Member States and “to all economic operators involved in
the management of copyright and related rights within the Community.” 46
From its very beginning, the Recommendation shows, on the one hand, a

44

Id. at 32.
Comm’n of the European Cmtys., Commission Recommendation of 18 May
2005 on collective cross-border management of copyright and related rights for
legitimate online music services, 2005/737/EC (May 18, 2005), available at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_276/l_27620051021en00540057.pdf
[hereinafter Commission Recommendation].
46
Id. ¶ 19.
45
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polarized concern with users and legal certainty, 47 and on the other, online
music services’ business models, with rights-holders joining one of these
two groups depending on the values or principles at stake. Its spirit is best
embodied by recital 8, which states that:
In the era of online exploitation of musical works . . . commercial
users need a licensing policy that corresponds to the ubiquity of
the online environment . . . . It is therefore appropriate to provide
for multi-territorial licensing in order to enhance greater legal
certainty to commercial users in relation to their activity and to
foster the development of legitimate online services, increasing,
in turn, the revenue stream for rights-holders. 48
¶25
Another goal of the Recommendation is to enhance the principle of
freedom of choice, a principle that directly interferes with the traditional
concepts of territoriality and even nationality. Recital 9 of the
Recommendation states that:

Freedom to provide collective management services across
national borders entails that rights-holders are able to freely
choose the collective rights manager for the management of the
rights necessary to operate legitimate online music services across
the Community. That right implies the possibility to entrust or
transfer all or a part of the online rights to another collective
rights manager irrespective of the Member State of residence or
the nationality of either the collective rights manager or the
rights-holder. 49
¶26
The picture becomes more interesting when we tie these principles
to those of equitable remuneration and nondiscrimination, a liaison
performed by recital 12, which adds “category of rights-holder” to residence
and nationality as forbidden grounds for discrimination. 50 This view is
furthered by recital 13, which underlines that “[t]here should be no
difference in treatment on the basis of category of membership in the
collective rights management society: all rights-holders, be they authors,
composers, publishers, record producers, performers or others, should be

47

See generally id. (characterizing “users” as “commercial users”).
Id. at recital 8.
49
Id. at recital 9 (emphasis added).
50
Commission Recommendation, supra note 48, at recital 12 (“Royalties
collected on behalf of right holders should be distributed equitably and without
discrimination on the grounds of residence, nationality, or category of rightsholder. In particular, royalties collected in behalf of rights-holders in Member
States other than those in which the rights-holders are resident or of which they
are nationals should be distributed as effectively and efficiently as possible.”).
48
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treated equally.” 51 Residence and nationality also reappear at the level of
the relationship between the collecting society and its member, with recital
11 stating that “[t]here should be no difference in treatment of rightsholders by rights managers on the basis of Member State of residence or
nationality.” 52 Paragraph 9 will fully embody the principle of
nondiscrimination, as applied to the granting of licenses to commercial
users. 53
¶27
Other principles stressed by the Recommendation are
rationalization and transparency in the relationship between the different
structures involved in cross-border management of rights. 54 The concept of
rationalization seems to be connected with the notions of efficiency and
effectiveness. 55 Unfortunately, the actual recommendations made by the
Commission in the paragraphs to follow are too broad in scope to offer a
substantive view of what steps rationalization may require collecting
societies to take. Regarding transparency, however, Paragraph 14, which is
dedicated to accountability, states that, “[c]ollective rights managers should
report regularly to all right-holders they represent, whether directly or under
reciprocal representation agreements, on any licenses granted, applicable
tariffs and royalties collected and distributed.” 56

Both transparency and rationalization requirements are connected
with the Commission’s concerns with users: recital 13 explicitly articulates
¶28

51

Id. at recital 13 (“Additional recommendations on accountability, rightholder
representation in the decision-making bodies of collective rights managers and
dispute resolution should ensure that collective rights managers achieve a higher
level of rationalisation and transparency and that rightholders and commercial
users can make informed choices. There should be no difference in treatment on
the basis of category of membership in the collective rights management
society: all right-holders, be they authors, composers, publishers, record
producers, performers or others, should be treated equally.”).
52
Id. at recital 10 (“The relationship between right-holders and collective rights
managers, whether based on contract or statutory membership rules, should
include a minimum protection for right-holders with respect to all categories of
rights that are necessary for the provision of legitimate online music services.
There should be no difference in treatment of right-holders by rights managers
on the basis of the Member State of residence or nationality.”).
53
Id. ¶ 9 (“Collective rights managers should grant commercial users licenses on
the basis of objective criteria and without any discrimination among users.”
(emphasis added)).
54
See id. at recital 10 (“Fostering effective structures for cross-border
management of rights should also ensure that collective rights management
achieve a higher level of rationalisation and transparency, with regard to
compliance with competition rules . . . .”).
55
Commission Recommendation, supra note 48, at recital 12.
56
Id. ¶ 14.
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the relationship between those two principles and the ability of commercial
users, as well as rights-holders, to make “informed choices.” 57
¶29
Finally, paragraph 4 will add the principle of diligence to the ones
listed in the introductory recitals. 58
¶30
If one stopped reading the Recommendation at the end of the
recitals, the most important trends characterizing the path that the
Commission has chosen to follow would already be recognizable: after
acknowledging the constraints placed on the online music market by a
strong territorial approach and detrimental effects of such an approach on
users (burdened by legal uncertainty and a country–to–country based access
to music), copyright holders (bound to rigid licensing schemes that are
likely to diminish their revenues) and collecting societies (prevented from
having wider, more efficient, regional business models), the Commission
relies heavily on the principle of nondiscrimination (which will materialize
in paragraph 13) as a means of counterbalancing the loss of territoriality that
a pan-European, or even a multinational licensing scheme, would imply.
Attached to nondiscrimination, there is a set of other principles aimed at
promoting a more expeditious and robust licensing process: transparency,
efficiency, and equitable remuneration, whose ultimate practical effect is to
empower copyright holders. From an economical point of view, copyright
holders are the ones who arguably have more to gain from a multi-territorial
licensing scheme and, consentaneously with this perspective, the
Commission spends much of its time focusing on ways to strengthen their
position vis-à-vis the collecting societies. 59

A. The Online Music Market
¶31
One problem with the content of this Recommendation is that some
of its definitions – and roughly a quarter of its length is spent on definitions
– are tautological. Consider, for instance, paragraph 1 (d): “multi-territorial
license means a license which covers the territory of more than one Member
state).” 60
¶32
Other definitions are far more helpful, such as the one contained in
paragraph 1 (a), which specifies that for the purposes of this

57

Id. at recital 13 (“Additional recommendations on accountability, rightsholder representation in the decision-making bodies of collective rights
managers and dispute resolution should ensure that collective rights managers
achieve a higher level of rationalisation and transparency and that rights-holders
and commercial users can make informed choices . . . .”).
58
Id. ¶ 4 (“Collective rights managers should apply the utmost diligence in
representing the interests of rights-holders.”).
59
See id. ¶ 3.
60
Commission Recommendation, supra note 48, ¶ 1(d).

200x

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. x

Recommendation, “management of copyright and related rights” includes
“the grant of licenses to commercial users, the auditing and monitoring of
rights, the enforcement of copyright and related rights, the collection of
royalties and the distribution of royalties to right-holders.” 61
¶33
The most interesting part of the Recommendation is probably the
introduction of a definition of online rights, 62 which are split into three
categories:



The exclusive right of reproduction of intangible copies made in
the process of online distribution of musical works. 63



The right of communication to the public of a musical work either
in the form of a right to authorize or a right to prohibit pursuant to
Directive 2001/29/EC, 64 or a right to equitable remuneration
pursuant to Directive 92/100/EEC 65 – and here the
Recommendation specifies that these rights apply to webcasting,
internet radio and simulcasting, 66 or “near-on-demand services
received either on a personal computer or on a mobile telephone.” 67



The exclusive right of making available a musical work pursuant to
Directive 2001/29/EC – including on-demand and other interactive
services. 68

¶34
Paragraph 5 addresses the relationship between rights-holders and
collective rights managers in the online licensing environment. It is a
61

Id. ¶ 1(a), (h) (“[A] ‘commercial user’ means any person involved in the
provision of online music services who needs a license from rights-holders in
order to provide legitimate online music services . . . .”).
62
Id. ¶ 1(f).
63
Id. ¶ 1(f)(i).
64
Comm’n of the European Cmtys., Directive of the European Parliament and
the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of
copyright and related rights in the information society, 2001/29/EC (May 22,
2001), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/l_167/l_16720010622en00100019.pdf.
65
Council of the European Cmtys., Council Directive of 19 November 1992 on
rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the
field of intellectual property, 92/100/EEC (November 19, 1992), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/docs/1992-100_en.pdf.
66
Working Document, supra note 9, at 7 n.1 (“A simulcast is a ‘simultaneous
broadcast,’ and refers to programs or events broadcast across more than one
medium at the same time. Streaming allows data to be transferred in a stream of
packets that are interpreted as they arrive for ‘just-in-time’ delivery of
multimedia information. A webcast is similar to a broadcast television program
but designed for internet transmission.”).
67
Commission Recommendation, supra note 45, ¶ 1(f)(ii).
68
Id. ¶ 1(f)(iii).
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provision crafted with the intent of giving rights-holders the maximum
autonomy and freedom of choice. 69 It establishes a set of minimum criteria
that should govern the relationship between rights-holders and collective
rights managers: rights-holders have the ability to determine the online
rights that they want to entrust for collective management; the ability to
“determine the territorial scope of the mandate of the collective rights
managers;” 70 and the right to withdraw any of the rights that they have
entrusted to a particular manager, 71 and “transfer the multi-territorial
management of those rights to another . . . manager, irrespective of the
Member State of residence or the nationality of either the . . . manager or
the right-holder.” 72
¶35
Paragraph 6 places upon the collective rights manager the
correlative duty of informing “right-holders and commercial users of the
repertoire they represent, any existing reciprocal representation agreements,
the territorial scope of their mandates for that repertoire and the applicable
tariffs.” 73
¶36
The principle of equitable remuneration materializes in paragraph
10, 74 coupled with the provisions on deductions, both reflecting the
Commission’s concerns with transparency and information; in this sense,
paragraph 11 requires that:

Contracts and statutory membership rules governing the
relationship between collective rights managers and right-holders
for the management, at Community level, of musical works for
online use should specify whether and to what extent, there will be
deductions for purposes other than for the management of the
services provided. 75
¶37
Information and transparency will play a crucial role in the
successful development of any kind of multi-territorial music license that
Europe may come to implement, since most of the non-legal obstacles to the
expansion of collecting societies – even of the ones that operate at a
69

See id. ¶ 5(a).
Id. ¶ 5(b).
71
Id. ¶ 5(c) (noting that rights-holders have to give “reasonable notice of their
intention” to withdraw.).
72
In cases of transference of management, paragraph 5(d) imposes that,
“without prejudice to other forms of cooperation among rights managers,” all
online rights have also to be withdrawn from “any existing reciprocal
representation agreement concluded amongst them.” Id. ¶ 5(d).
73
Commission Recommendation, supra note 45, ¶ 6.
74
“Collective rights managers should distribute royalties to all rights-holders or
category of rights-holders they represent in an equitable manner.” Id. ¶ 10.
75
Id. ¶ 11 (emphasis added). Paragraph 12 further specifies that this information
is to be provided “[u]pon payment of royalties.” Id. ¶ 12.
70
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national circumscribed level – is precisely the mistrust felt and expressed by
a large number of rights-holders (particularly the small and medium sized
ones). 76
At least in theory, this scheme should give rights-holders a greater
ability to control and exploit their online rights, while at the same time solve
some of the mistrust issues that have undermined their relationship with
collecting societies. As mentioned above, 77 paragraph 14 also plays an
important role in establishing accountability rules that ensure that collective
rights managers will provide information on a regular basis about the
applicable tariffs and the royalties that have been collected. 78
¶38

76

Tilman Lueder, Head of the Copyright Unit – DG Internal Market and
Services, made some interesting remarks on this topic:
This is an especially thorny area. Collective management has not
always [been] seen as a “fair deal” by artists and rights-holders,
particularly those who don’t live in countries where royalties are
collected on their behalf. For example, a pending complaint alleges
that the Scottish actor Sean Connery has never received € 95.963
from the French collective rights management society ADAMI
because ADAMI states that it does not have Mr. Connery’s address.
....
Transparency is important because foreign authors and other holders
of copyright don’t always know how proceeds from their royalties are
being spent. In some cases, domestic collecting societies take a cut of
royalties to support cultural initiatives or even retirement funds.
These initiatives are often undertaken for the sole benefit of domestic
rights-holders. We are thinking about an obligation that requires
collective rights management societies to indicate clearly the
deductions they make before distributing royalties for activities such
as pension funds and cultural promotion. National borders are clearly
also an issue in this area. Content providers such as publishing houses
and music companies increasingly see the national management of
copyright as an impediment to the rollout of trans-border online
services. We need to introduce clear rules on the terms and tariffs that
online service providers have to pay for copyright licenses. Service
providers must be able to contest tariffs – particularly in cases where
the tariffs are so high that it makes it hard to launch or operate webbased delivery models.
Tilman Lueder, Speech at the 13th Annual Conference on International
Intellectual Property Law & Policy: Legislative and Policy Developments in the
European Union (2005), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/docs/fordham2005_en.pdf.
77
See ¶ 27 supra.
78
See Commission Recommendation, supra note 45, ¶ 14.
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The Recommendation finishes with the follow-up provisions,
inviting both Member States and collective rights managers to report on a
yearly basis to the Commission on “the measures they have taken in relation
to” the Recommendation and “on the management, at Community level, of
copyright and related rights for the provision of legitimate online music
services.” 79 The Commission also assures the Member States that it will
monitor “on a continuous basis” the development “of the online music
sector in the light of this Recommendation” and evaluate the need “for
further action at Community level.” 80
¶39

It took the Parliament almost two years to answer back to the
Commission. In the meantime, the Commission itself released a Working
Document that is essentially an ex post explanation of the ex ante
Recommendation economic assessment of possible solutions regarding
transnational management of rights. 81 There were, of course, reactions from
the music, broadcasting, and cultural industries in general, but not a single
Member State took any step forward with respect to this issue. 82 Eventually,
the first move belonged to the collecting societies themselves. 83 The legal
landscape, nevertheless, remained still.
¶40

B. A Preliminary Assessment
¶41
The most disappointing aspect of this Recommendation is its
nature. If the European Commission was convinced that this was indeed the
way for Europe to move forward, it is frustrating to see what could have
been a quasi-revolutionary act turn into an act that appears together with
other acts “with no binding force.” 84 Given the size and potentialities of the
European online music market and all its ramifications, a stronger approach
to the problem was absolutely needed. 2005 was the time to seize the
opportunity – to catch the train while it was still leaving the station.
Perhaps the Recommendation’s form was chosen instead of any other
binding instrument due to understandable doubts about the overall
suitability of this approach in a mosaic like Europe. Additionally, had the
Commission been bold enough, it could have even been more farsighted and
ventured to touch other copyright-related domains, such as broadcasting.
This field is particularly interesting because it is surrounded by great legal
uncertainty. The Internet has lead to the dissemination of copyrighted works
under a hybrid form; works that are downloaded via on-demand services but
79

See id. ¶¶ 16–18.
See id. ¶ 18.
81
See Working Document, supra note 9.
82
If anything, there was only a big disappointment, see id. at 36 (explaining the
continued legal uncertainty from failure to act).
83
See id. at 36–37.
84
See EC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 249.
80

200x

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. x

also share the characteristics of broadcasting. Europe, however, does not
have a provision regulating this potential overlap. When it comes to music,
it would have been particularly helpful to have some sort of guidance on
whether these cases fall within the “making available” right, 85 or whether
they are left for broadcast regulation to address.
¶42
Clearly, the Commission is not misunderstanding the nature of the
problem – and the proof is this very Recommendation, which accurately
diagnoses it:

Licensing of online rights is often restricted by territory, and
commercial users negotiate in each Member State with each of
the respective collective rights managers for each right that is
included in the online exploitation. 86
¶43
There are too many ‘eaches’ in the equation. But while it grasps the
smaller problem, the Commission seems unable to see the bigger picture:
that a binding act is needed and that the boundaries of music dissemination
via the Internet might not be as clear as one might initially think. Still, this
is a shift from the traditional “upwards” harmonizing tendency that the
Community has been so fond of where Intellectual Property is concerned. If
Hugenholtz in correct in stating that the European Institutions keep aiming
at the wrong target, 87 this time the Commission seems to have pointed at the
right one, although we are still waiting for it to fire the first shot.

C. The Commission Staff Working Document and Other Options
¶44
The 2005 Recommendation is the final product of the
Commission’s investment in the protection of a fairly new but nonetheless
solid grounded market: the online music licensing business. Prior to its
enactment, the Commission sought to evaluate the status of that market
through a series of studies, 88 having found that the current European
business model was a source of inefficiency. 89 The Recommendation thus
arose as an answer to the constraints that territoriality placed upon market
fluidity, the legal uncertainty that surrounded the emergent urge to license,
and the lack of transparency in the relationship between rights-holders and
collective rights managers.

85

See Commission Recommendation, supra note 45, at recital 5.
Id. at recital 7 (emphasis added).
87
HUGENHOLTZ ET AL., supra note 5.
88
Id.
89
See id. at 22 (detailing the fragmented, inconsistent, and static nature of
existing Directives).
86

200x

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. x

However, besides other strategic options such as initiating the
process for the enactment of a binding act regulating cross-border music
licensing, the Commission did have other substantive choices that it could
have pursued. It is important to address those other solutions the
Commission at some point envisioned, eventually dismissed, but came to
light in July of the same year.
¶45

¶46
The Commission Staff Working Document presents three
approaches to cross-border management of rights under a section entitled
“Policy Options,” 90 described as being the following:



Do nothing 91



Eliminate territorial restrictions and discriminatory provisions in
the reciprocal representation agreements concluded between
collective rights managers 92



Give rights-holders the choice to authorize collecting societies of
their choice to online rights for the entire European Union 93

¶47
It is odd – and it is certainly not a very good sign – to see a “do
nothing” solution even considered after the findings of major inefficiencies
in the copyright licensing system. 94 This puzzling part of the Commission
Staff Working Document was obviously one of the main targets of criticism
of the several reactions that followed its publication. 95 The conclusion
under this so-called policy option is that there would probably be a limited
form of multi-territorial license, anyway, but “there would be no choice as
to the collective rights manager who would provide this license.” 96
According to the Commission Staff, “this would mean that multi-territorial
licenses could only be given for online exploitation and by the collective
rights manager in the territory where the licensee has its ‘economic

90

See Working Document, supra note 9, at 33-34.
Id. at 33.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 34.
94
This line of reasoning is matched throughout the Working Document by
charming statements such as, “Doing nothing will have no impact outside the
EU.” Id. at 43. The Working Document also discusses the internal and external
effects of each one of the three options. See id. at 34–57.
95
See, e.g., Position Paper, European Broad. Union, Initial EBU Comments on
Commission Staff Working Document: Study on a Community Initiative on the
Cross-Border Collective Management of Copyright (Aug. 19, 2005), available at
http://www.ebu.ch/CMSimages/en/leg_pp_crossborder_collectivemanagment_1
90805_tcm6-40156.pdf (“Option 1 (do nothing) is indeed not acceptable”).
96
See Working Document, supra note 9, at 34.
91
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residence.’” 97 It is very basic logic, but at least the Working Document
succeeds in realizing that this consequence would constitute “an undue
hindrance to the provision of a cross-border commercial rights management
service to users resident in other territories.” 98
¶48
The second approach – elimination of territorial restrictions and
discriminatory provisions in the reciprocal representation agreements – was
described in the Working Document as a solution that would “introduce a
single entry point and choice for commercial end users but it would not
introduce increased choice as to collective rights manager at the level of for
right-holders.” 99 This approach would improve the collection of royalties
and their administration by the management society, at the same time that it
would banish “customer allocation clauses.” 100 However, it would not
completely eliminate the limitations on rights-holders’ freedom to choose a
rights manager in a different territory and entrusting it with a pan-European
management of his rights. The Working Document concludes that, if this is
the path chosen, collective rights managers have no scope “to improve their
services or differentiate their repertoires by actively competing for the
business of right-holders.” 101 The only benefit of this approach appears to
be, in the Commission Staff’s view, with respect to licensing, that this
solution would “ensure . . . the territorial restrictions in classical reciprocity
agreements that hinder the affiliate society from licensing the management
society’s repertoire beyond its own home territory” would be “removed
from all reciprocal representation agreements.” 102 But then again, it “will
not resolve the issue that most CRMs are entirely dependent on reciprocal
agreements in order to offer their repertoire.” 103 Moreover, “[t]his leads to a
situation where almost no CRM has an attractive repertoire of its own, but
all of them, by virtue of a network of reciprocity, offer an identical
repertoire to commercial users.” 104
¶49
The third option – allowing rights-holders to choose a particular
collecting society to manage their online rights for all of Europe – was the
approach chosen by the Recommendation. The Working Paper points out
the advantages of such a solution:

97

Id.
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. Current reciprocal representation agreements restrict the affiliated
societies’ ability to grant multi-territorial licenses to content providers whose
economic residence is located in its “home” territory – these are the so-called
“consumer allocation clauses.” Id.
101
See id.
102
Working Document, supra note 9, at 34.
103
Id. at 34–35.
104
Id. at 35.
98
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it cuts off the intermediary (the affiliate society), which is directly
replaced by direct membership in a collective rights management
society of the choice of the copyright owner. 105



in return, the inexistence of these intermediary societies, which as
the holders of foreign repertoire “can limit the territorial authority
of the licensor to clear the rights in its home territory only,” opens
up the possibility of having a European-wide management of
rights. 106



direct membership also eliminates the deductions that reciprocal
agreements always imply, thus increasing the rights-holders
revenues. 107



a market that is no longer shaped by territory not only increases the
rights-holder choices and stimulates copyright management
services to compete, but also forces some of these services to
differentiate themselves “by offering different elements of the
management services they provide for right-holders.” 108



generalized cross-border licensing will also lead to the formation of
niche licensing markets, 109 which ultimately could be said to
promote cultural diversity.

Id.
Id.
107
The Working Paper suggests that this effect would favor “big rights-holders,”
the ones “whose work is exploited on a large scale across the EU.” See id. at 35–
36. But it is arguable that this will favor big, medium, and small rights-holders
as well—the bigger ones because of the reduction in transaction costs, and the
medium- and small-sized ones because they will proportionally benefit from the
elimination of the reciprocal agreement deductions and they will now have the
chance to have their music licensed in a much broader, quasi-non-territorial
market.
108
Working Document, supra note 9, at 35. These services would consist in
differentiation “in terms of, e.g., the method applied in monitoring use made of
works (detailed monitoring of all occasions where works are used as opposed to
surveys).” Id. Other examples are “the speed in which royalties are remitted to
right-holders or the level of detail in which a right-holder is informed of the
different uses made of his protected works.” Id. According to the Commission
Staff’s reasoning, these would be the appealing factors to small rights-holders.
Id.
109
In the words of the Commission Staff:
The increasing diversity of online music services will create a
demand for cross-border genre-specific licenses. . . . This
development would increase efficiency thereby making [collective
rights managers] more attractive to right-holders and commercial
users alike. For a series of customer groups with a specific demand,
106
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A comparison between Policy Options 2 and 3 shows that:

¶50



at the level of competition, “[i]n Option 3, [collecting societies]
would have to compete among themselves to attract right-holders,
while in Option 2 [collecting societies] would compete to attract
the business of commercial users. Option 3 can therefore be
referred to as the ‘right-holders option’ while option 2 is more
favourable to commercial users.” 110 However, the competition
fostered by Option 2 leaves “in place the membership limitations
contained in the underlying reciprocal arrangements,” which are a
source of “static” service, 111 freezing competition between
collecting societies, whereas Option 3, “by giving right-holders the
possibility to freely choose and move among [collective rights
managers], would create the competitive discipline that forces
[collecting societies] to compete among themselves for rightholders and negotiate advantageous royalties on their behalf. If
their services were either inefficient or too expensive, right-holders
would move to another rights manager. This level of competitive
threat would counteract any tendency toward monopoly at the
Community level.” 112

Option 3 presents an alternative for the standardized and uniform
service currently offered under the reciprocal agreements.
Id. at 36.
110
Id. at 40.
111
Id. at 41. This would happen because:
Removing the territorial restriction and customer allocation clauses
would give all 25 potential entry points the unlimited ability to grant
multi-repertoire licenses that, in addition, covers all 25 national
territories; [t]here would be no variation as to the multi-repertoire
and multi-territory service offered by the 25 competing [collecting
societies]. Indeed, all the elements of the underlying rights
management service remain static. This is because right-holders,
under the current system of reciprocity, must remain members of
their respective management societies and these management
societies, in turn, would remain ‘locked-in’ into the network of
reciprocal agreements; . . . In these circumstances, this static network
of reciprocal agreements will, in due course, confer monopoly power
onto the affiliate societies’ that commercial users have initially
chosen as their single access point and freeze competition at that
level. In addition, once the affiliate societies and their commercial
users have an established course of dealing by putting in place
mutually interoperable electronic monitoring and payment systems,
there is the additional risk of ‘lock-in’ at the commercial users’
level.”
Id.
112
Id.
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at the level of trade flows, Option 2 would eliminate the two forms
of territorial restrictions that govern the current reciprocal
arrangements: “it would extend the affiliate society’s authority to
license the management society’s repertoire beyond its home
territory and thus grant a license that also covers the management
society’s territory,” 113 and allow the affiliate society to “grant
licenses also to commercial users whose economic residence it not
within their home territory. Eliminating these forms of territorial
restrictions will foster cross-border trade in collective online rights
management in the Community.” 114 To the eyes of the Commission
Staff, Option 3 would maximize these effects because “trade flows
will no longer depend on the proper functioning of reciprocal
representation agreements but on the direct relationship between
right-holders and the [collective rights management societies] of
their choice.” 115



at the level of innovation and growth, “Option 2 would stimulate
the roll-out of new online services because the requisite
Community-wide license would be available at a single access
point to be freely chosen by the commercial user.” 116 The problem
with this approach is that “obtaining the multi-repertoire and multiterritorial license at a single entry point by enhancing the network
of reciprocal representation agreements among [collective rights
management societies] would be costly and detrimental to rightholders. Given that royalties are channeled via both the affiliate and
the management society, the cost of maintaining the web of
reciprocity would be burdensome and corresponding deductions
would be made by both the affiliate and the management society,
before the right-holders are paid.” 117 Option 3, on the other hand,
would create a single entry point for “all European repertoire for
all European territories because the European repertoire will be
split among a small number of [collecting societies].” 118



at the level of prices, the Working Paper indicates that “Option 2
would most likely achieve little in terms of pricing pressure on
licenses taken out by commercial users. This is because these

Working Document, supra note 9, at 39.
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 40.
117
Id.
118
Working Document, supra note 9, at 40. Notice, however, that it would
maximize the incentive to create because “rights-holders receive royalties from
their collective rights manager of choice in line with actual use made of their
works.” (emphasis added). See id.
114
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licenses will be governed by the tariffs applicable in the country
where the copy-right protected work is accessible to the end
consumer and possible competition with respect to administrative
cost is a small part of a multi-repertoire and multi-territorial
license.” 119 On the other hand, Option 3, by creating new
opportunities for services and enhancing consumer choice, “would
allow for premium content to be priced higher because it gives the
collective rights manager who has attracted such content a very
strong bargaining position vis-à-vis commercial users.” 120


The Commission Staff also considered that both Options 2 and 3
would potentially promote culture and foster creativity, since they
“increase the overall amount of revenues created by copyright
licensing in the online environment and thus ‘enlarge the pie’ to be
distributed to all right-holders across the EU,” 121 but provided no
convincing evidence linking the increase in revenues with the
investment in culture; instead it followed a rather frail and
speculative line of reasoning: “[Collective rights managers] may
therefore engage in (1) a diversified sponsorship policy across more
than one Member State showcasing domestic talent; (2) finding
new audiences for various sectors of creation, notably in difficult
fields like contemporary music as opposed to limiting it to national
audiences only (3) cultural events featuring domestic content with
an international platform; (5) financial support for musical and
audiovisual productions on a national and international level.” 122 It
may have a valid point, though, when it states that “[b]etter crossborder licensing would make available a larger variety of crossborder programming for the various language and cultural
communities across Europe, wherever they reside.” 123

The Working Paper takes some other prongs in consideration while
comparatively reviewing Options 2 and 3, but some of them do not rise
above the level of mere theoretical speculation, totally lacking supporting
evidence. 124 The overall assessment points clearly to a prevalence of Option

¶51

119

Id. at 43.
Id.
121
Id. at 38.
122
Id.
123
Working Document, supra note 9, at 38.
124
Id. at 43. Consider, for instance, the analysis of the level of the impact that
the implementation of one of these systems would have outside the European
Union: the Paper’s only assertion is that “[i]ntroducing enhanced royalty flow
across national borders and introducing better multiterritorial licensing might
lead to rights-holders from third countries, especially under Option 3, electing to
120

200x

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. x

3’s benefits over those offered by Option 2, a view that is consentaneous
with the philosophy adopted by the Recommendation. The question now is:
did the Commission Staff take the best approach to the problem? And,
whether the previous question is answered in the affirmative or not, does the
Recommendation succeed in promoting the goals the Commission is
seeking to enforce?
¶52
Regarding the first question, the Commission Staff did perform an
overall coherent analysis, although it relied on a major assumption that
competition is the natural answer to the static and dynamic inefficiencies
observed in the modus operandi of Europe’s collective rights management
societies. 125 A different view, supported by authors like Towse and
Handke, suggests that these societies are actually monopolies or narrow
oligopolies and that competition may well produce the opposite effect, an
undesired increase in licensing costs. 126
¶53
Towse and Handke’s study offers a very interesting analysis of the
economics of copyright licensing and points out that Europe’s recent
copyright policy (especially where cross-border management of rights is
concerned) has been much closer to the Anglo-American tradition than to
the continental droit d’auteur approach. 127 “[T]he predominance of
economic objectives is not only a question of the preferences of current
[European Union] decision-makers but it is built into the very legal
structure of the [European Union].” 128

The authors’ inference that the measures proposed by the
Commission are unlikely to improve the transnational music licensing
scheme in Europe’s collecting societies is rooted in the idea that the Internet
and technology, especially digital rights management, are incapable of
contradicting the tendency of economies of scale to reinstate monopolies. 129
¶54

have their rights managed by EU based collective rights management societies.”
Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
125
See id. at 40–41.
126
See Ruth Towse & Christian Handke, Regulating Copyright Collecting
Societies: Current Policy in Europe, 2007 SOC’Y FOR ECON. RES. COPYRIGHT
ISSUES 1, available at http://www2.huberlin.de/gbz/downloads/pdf/SERCIACPapers/towsehandke.pdf.
127
Id. at 2 (noting that this is less a voluntary choice of the policy makers than a
consequence of the legal architecture of the Union; “Article 151 of the Treaty,
introduced with the Maastricht revision in 1991, requires the European
Community to take cultural aspects into account in its actions but not to develop
a cultural policy per se”).
128
Id. at 2.
129
Id. at 10 (providing a particular view of the nature and role of collective
rights management societies: not only do the authors believe that these societies
are natural monopolies, but they also picture them as some sort of “common
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They align with the economists that claim that “a natural monopoly is best
left intact but unregulated,” 130 a view that, in the present case, clashes with
the Commission’s position on the advantages of robust competition. As the
authors put it, “whether the existence of a single supplier of collective rights
management services for a particular bundle of rights is beneficial for
society at large depends on the extent to which [collecting societies] exploit
their monopoly position to raise prices or to tolerate inefficiencies within
their organization or how successfully they can be regulated.” 131 The
Commission would therefore have misevaluated the size of the European
market; in markets as large as Japan and the United States, “there is no
effective competition between collective rights management societies,”132 a
phenomenon that the authors link to the high fixed costs of entry. The
consequences of promoting competition within the European Union could
therefore lead to the appearance of a limited number of new collecting
societies, but nevertheless “mergers would soon take place to benefit from
economies of scale and network effects . . . and natural monopoly would
reassert itself.” 133
¶55
Treating collecting societies as monopolies or oligopolies is a
position that also takes issue with the Commission’s argument that
competition promotes innovation because it enables users to shop around
for the society that best represents their interests. However, Towse and
Handke argue that, even if this was true, it would lead to a “tragedy of the
anti-commons,” in the sense that “excessive debundling of rights . . . would
vastly increase search and other transaction costs for users.” 134 The
Commission’s option for forcing collecting societies to operate at a
Community-wide level would therefore be a “traditional” competition law
approach that “ignores several important features of collecting societies.”135
This fact leads the Authors to conclude that “[i]t is hard to see how the
Commission can achieve its aims without changing copyright law. It could
even be argued that the root of the problem lies with copyright law itself,
which by proliferating rights has created the need for an ever more complex

carriers” in the sense that they “are required to admit all eligible right-holders as
members” or alternatively as “social insurance” societies, because “they operate
similarly to an insurer that is regulated in order to provide an essential service
for everyone in the market it serves, analogously, for example, to a private
health insurer that is prevented from excluding high risk categories from its
insurance”).
130
Towse & Handke, supra note 124, at 11 (attributing this principle to William
Baumol).
131
Id. at 11.
132
Id. at 12.
133
Id.
134
Id at 13.
135
Towse & Handke, supra note 124, at 14–15.
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system of [collective rights management] societies to make it workable.” 136
This is another aspect of the paradox addressed by Hugenholtz, because
“[w]ithout [collective rights management societies], the majority of creators
and other right-holders would not be able to enjoy the benefits of copyright
law, thus defeating its purpose. [Collecting societies] are the spontaneous
private solution to government failure in the enforcement of copyright law;
however, when they collaborated in order to facilitate online rights licensing
it was dubbed collusive.” 137

D. Monitoring Process by the European Commission
¶56
On January 17, 2007, the Commission called for comments that
received eighty-nine replies from a wide variety of stakeholders. 138 After
this monitoring process, the Commission concluded that there was a nascent
market for EU-wide licensing of music for online services (it seems at least
odd that four years after the Commission started its work, the market is still
considered to be nascent) and that the Recommendation seems to have
produced some impact. This fact would mean that no further measures
would be needed, not even the repetition of the monitoring process, which
would only take place “should a clear need to do so arise.” 139
¶57
In a very short report of seven pages, the Commission summarized
the replies received from the stakeholders, which are grouped in four
categories: collecting societies, with almost half of the replies, (music)
publishers, users (mostly broadcasters) and Member States (it is mentioned
that eight Member States replied, although on the list of published replies
one can only find six: France, Cyprus, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden
and the UK). 140
¶58
The call for comments was structured around several issues. The
first question was whether it was necessary to have binding rules on a
variety of topics such as licensing, transparency and governance,
assignment and withdrawal of online rights. While most collecting societies
and publishers were not inclined to binding rules, users took the opposite
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Id at 15.
Id.
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Non-confidential contributions are made available on the following website:
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/management/management_en.htm
#contributions.
139
See Monitoring of the 2005 Music Online Recommendation [hereinafter
Monitoring the Recommendation], at 1, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/management/monitoringreport_en.pdf.
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See id. at 3.
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view and Member States showed concern that the non-legislative approach
“circumvent[ed] the democratic process.” 141
¶59
As far as E.U.-wide-licensing is concerned, the ultimate goal of the
Commission’s recommendation, the monitoring processes acknowledged
several initiatives that were announced or formed (Alliance Digital,
ARMONIA, CELAS, PEDL, SACEM-UMPG, etc.). 142 Nevertheless, at the
time of the adoption of the monitoring report, only one E.U.-wide license
had been granted (CELAS with the mobile operator Omniforne covering the
MusicStation download service for the EMI repertoire). 143
¶60
The monitoring report also listed the obstacles for EU-wide
licensing as reported by the stakeholders, ongoing litigation among
collecting societies, withholding taxes and identification of works, as well
as the stakeholders’ responses to the question of whether the
Recommendation correctly set out the online rights. 144 Users seemed to be
satisfied with the level of delineation or fragmentation of rights operated by
the Recommendation, while collecting societies claimed that they were not
properly defined. 145
¶61
Finally, with regard to governance and transparency, collecting
societies failed to see any problems surrounding this issue and mentioned a
“Common Declaration” between ICMP/CIEM and GESAC that would
contain harmonized minimum standards that were considered good
practices. 146 The report also stated that users did not voice strong feelings
about transparency and governance per se. 147

If one thing has become clear after this monitoring report, it is that,
at least for the time being, contrary to the views expressed by the European
Parliament, which are summarized below, the European Commission seems
to have lost the appetite for legislation in this area. Although it is fair to say
the recommendation triggered some interesting movements among
collecting societies, it is difficult to argue that it has achieved the objectives
that the documents issued back in 2004 and 2005 considered necessary for
the good functioning of an internal market in online music services.
Therefore, it appears it would have been easy for the Commission to
recommend the adoption of a binding instrument.

¶62
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See id. at 4.
See id. at 5–7.
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See id. at 6.
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See Monitoring the Recommendation, supra note 142, at 7.
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III. THE 2007 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT NON-LEGISLATIVE
RESOLUTION
The European Parliament Resolution of March 13, 2007, 148 was in
certain ways a virulent response to the 2005 Commission Recommendation.
However, it should be noted in advance that a significant part of the
Parliament’s dissatisfaction derived from its belief that the Commission
“failed to undertake a broad and thorough consultation process with
interested parties and with Parliament before adopting the
Recommendation,” 149 which is “formally unacceptable” under European
Law because “the Recommendation clearly goes further than merely
interpreting or supplementing existing rules.” 150
¶63

¶64
But the Parliament also departs from the Commission’s substantive
approach to cross-border rights management regulation. It sees this moment
as the opportunity to regulate a broader reality:

whilst the Recommendation is intended to cover only the online
sale of music recordings, its broad wording also covers other
online services (such as broadcasters' services) which happen to
include music from such recordings but which would suffer from
the legal uncertainty that the Recommendation creates as to which
licensing regime would apply to such services. 151
¶65
One of the measures that the Parliament will require the
Commission to do after the initial considerations is to come up with a
scheme that guarantees the efficiency and coherence of licensing systems,
for example, “by enabling broadcasters to acquire rights in accordance with
the copyright legislation of the Member State in which the program in
question originates and simplify the extension of existing collective
agreements so as to include interactive online distribution of existing
content (e.g. podcasting).” 152

Besides the different approach regarding the scope of cross-border
regulation, the Parliament also believes that the freedom of choice so highly
emphasized by the Commission should be “accompanied by appropriate
measures to safeguard and promote the diversity of cultural expression,

¶66

148

European Parliament Resolution of 13 March 2007 on the Commission
Recommendation of 18 October 2005 on Collective Cross-Border Management
of Copyright and Related Rights for Legitimate Online Music Services, T60064/2007, [herinafter European Parliament Resolution] available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA2007-0064&language=EN.
149
Id. ¶ A.
150
Id. ¶ B.
151
Id. ¶ W.
152
Id. No. 6 (emphasis added).
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notably by offering users, via one and the same collecting society, large
diversified repertoires, including local and niche repertoires and in
particular the world repertoire for broadcasters’ services.” 153 This is a
concern in the July 2005 Working Paper, but that as a matter of policy was
practically absent from the May 2005 Recommendation, which makes little
sense.
¶67
The Parliament departs from the criticism in Towse and Handke’s
article, stating it is important to preserve the “existing system of reciprocal
agreements and the reciprocal collection of royalties . . . so that competition
is introduced on the basis of the efficiency and quality of the services that
collective rights management societies can offer.” 154 It also considers that
“the system of reciprocal representation agreements should be maintained,
as it enables all commercial and individual users without discrimination to
have equal access to the world repertoire, ensures better protection for the
right-holders, guarantees real cultural diversity and stimulates fair
competition in the internal market.” 155 However, this is not a radically
opposite view to the one presented by the economic analysis of collecting
societies. From the Parliament’s perspective, monopolies may indeed occur
in this segment of the internal market, but their negative outputs are
avoidable: “with regard to possible abuses of monopolies, there is a need for
better governance of some collective rights management societies through
improved solidarity, transparency, non-discrimination, fair and balanced
representation of each category of right-holders and accountability rules
combined with appropriate control mechanisms in Member States.” 156
Simultaneously, while favoring the existence of a plurality of competing
entities, the Parliament associates the need to prevent forum-shopping with
the above mentioned principles. 157
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Id. ¶ M.
European Parliament Resolution, supra note 151, ¶ N.
155
Id. ¶ O. It also invites the Commission to design a licensing scheme that
should “avoid the over-centralization of market powers and repertoires by
ensuring that exclusive mandates may not be granted to a single or a very few
collective rights management societies by major right-holders, thereby
guaranteeing that the global repertoire remains available to all collective rights
management societies for the granting of licenses to users.” Id. at No. 6. Number
7 of the Resolution presents even more assertive language: “it is crucial to
prohibit any form of exclusive mandate between major right-holders and
collective rights management societies for the direct collection of royalties in all
Member States, as this would lead to the rapid extinction of national collective
rights management societies and undermine the position of minority repertoires
and cultural diversity in Europe,” Id. at No. 7.
156
Id. ¶ R.
157
‘Forum-shopping’ is defined as “users seeking out the collective rights
management society that provides the cheapest licenses.” Id. ¶ Q.
154
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As a result of these considerations, the Parliament invites the
Commission “to make it clear that the 2005 Recommendation applies
exclusively to online sales of music recordings,” 158 and to present “a
proposal for a flexible framework directive to be adopted by Parliament and
the Council.” 159 Besides the principles that the Recommendation itself had
sought to address (freedom of choice, transparency, equitable
remuneration), the Parliament particularly stresses the importance of
stimulating cultural diversity. In an interesting move, it ties this goal with
the necessity of avoiding “downward pressure on authors’ revenues.” 160
This downward pressure on royalty levels will be avoided by “ensuring that
users are licensed on the basis of the tariff applicable in the country where
the consumption of the copyrighted work (the so-called “country of
destination”) will take place, and help to achieve an appropriate level of
royalties for the rights-holders.” 161
¶68

¶69
Finally, the Parliament underlines the need to create an “alternative
dispute resolution” mechanism, a system that shall be “effective and
inexpensive” in order to avoid burdening users, particularly small and
medium-sized ones, with unreasonable costs. 162
¶70
The Parliament’s non-legislative Resolution is therefore both a
critic to and an improvement of the 2005 Recommendation. Ultimately, it
builds on many of the concepts and principles to which the Commission
resorted, sharing its underlying pro-competition approach to online rights
management across Europe.
¶71
Once again, everything lies in the hands of the Commission, a move
that makes this story a rather circular one; circularity that brings us to the
beginning of a series of events materializing into another opportunity of
aiming and shooting at the right target. However, in Europe’s case,
returning to the departing point will not exactly be a second chance. By
missing the first train, Europe missed the opportunity to shape the market –
for instance, if cultural diversity was one of the choices, by embedding it ab
initio in the system. This leads us to one last question: can Europe’s future
legislation on cross-border rights management be based on assumptions that
were made in 2004 and 2005 when that market was in its big bang period,
or should Europe start considering other solutions? Let us enunciate a (for
the time being, a remote but not impossible) possibility: Europe has had a
158

Id. at No. 1 (emphasis added).
European Parliament Resolution, supra note 151, at No. 1.
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Id. at No. 4 (“[The European Parliament c]onsiders also that the interests of
authors and therefore of cultural diversity in Europe will be best served by the
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Community Trademark since 1996, and the system has been working fairly
well. 163 Should this experience teach anything to Copyright Law? Certainly,
it does not suggest there should be a European Copyright – at least not in a
near future – but perhaps it could inspire a different online music licensing
system than the one the Commission has been pursuing. It could imply
abandoning the pro-competition approach and adopting a model closer to
Towse and Handke’s, with some sort of central European Office that
nonetheless could integrate the existing major European collecting societies.
And while this option depends on the economic approach that we
might relate to the role of collecting societies and to the role that new
technologies play in a regional but still State–based system, there is yet
another reason for us to consider the possibility of having a centralized
rights management scheme and abolishing every kind of intra-State
representation agreements – today’s music distribution is not merely
borderless, it is actively anti-territorial, which means it might be a good
time to consider this an area where the old principle of territoriality simply
does not make sense.

¶72

CONCLUSIONS: TERRITORIALITY RECONFIGURATED
¶73
The path followed by the European Commission regarding the
creation of a pan-European license was portrayed in this article as a rather
disappointing one, a sentiment which seems to be shared by scholars and
those who work in the music business alike. Nonetheless, Europe’s
institutional awareness to the problem of collecting societies relying on old
fashioned law and therefore following old fashioned business models did
have the merit of attracting scholarly and social debate to this issue. Too
meager a merit, it is true, particularly if we consider that the phenomenon of
legitimate online music services hit the European market and started
spreading around at a steadfast pace since 2004 regardless of the passivity
of the law. In any event, the Recommendation did trigger the Parliament’s
attention, leading to a Resolution that seems to shed some light on the
profile of a future pan-European license, applicable not only to the music
field but also to most of the services that rely on the latest communication
technologies.
¶74
That being said, it is at least questionable that the Resolution’s
proposals will smoothly materialize into European copyright law in the near
future. Regardless of the position that we choose to adopt in the
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The Office in Alicante received 43,000 applications in 1996; in 2007 the
number surpassed 80,000. Trade Marks and Designs Registration Office of the
European Union, Statistics of Community Trade Marks 2007, Overview of
Applications, SSC009.01, http://oami.europa.eu/pdf/office/SSC009Statistics_of_Community_Trade_Marks_2007.pdf.
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confrontation between competition and natural monopolies, the
Commission’s stammering Recommendation is clearly a sign of immaturity.
Non-binding recommendations and non-legislative resolutions are welcome,
but their nature limits their weight. As the Working Document would put
it: it is better to have the European institutions busy with this issue than
having them doing nothing about it. 164 Europe’s incapacity to seize the
opportunity to regulate – or de-regulate, had that been the option – a new
market when it first started to blossom, in a twirl of legal uncertainty and
surrounded by the negative effects of music piracy, is not merely due to the
Community’s structural limitations imposed by the founding treaties. The
fact that European copyright law has to resort to competition law to face
some of its limitations is one of the sides of the coin; the other is that, while
acknowledging that “the loss of territoriality brought about by the Internet”
is “difficult to reconcile with traditional copyright licensing schemes,” 165
Europe is not departing from those schemes and is reading the principle of
territoriality in the old-fashioned way.
More than the anxious response to technologies that are changing
the way we communicate and our business models, the core question of
cross-border right management lies in our relationship with the old
paradigm of territoriality. And yet, although copyright is closely associated
with territoriality, there is no longer very much in its essence that imposes
territoriality per se, particularly in a world that the Internet and technology
have rendered borderless. If we kept the same copyright rules for the next
millennium and if by the end of that time the entire world officially spoke
and wrote in Esperanto, there would probably be a couple of publishing
houses operating at a worldwide level, just as today the largest AngloAmerican publishing houses hold or co-hold the copyrights of the books
they publish in most (if not all) of English speaking countries. It would be
nonsense to say that these worldwide Esperanto publishers were bound by
territoriality, no matter how many licenses and agreements they had to enter
into (fault of an inefficient coordination of the substantive national laws) in
order to be able to do business worldwide.
¶75

¶76
In its own particular way, music is Esperanto. The fact that it is
being delivered instantaneously via digital means, unlike the hard-copy
books in the example, should reinforce the idea that our assumptions
regarding the role of territoriality have to be smoothened by the evidence
that pops out of the real world.
¶77
When Berne abolished the formalities in order to get a copyright
over a creative work, it was telling us that copyright was not patent law and
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See discussion supra notes 94–101and accompanying text (discussing the
problems with “doing nothing”).
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Press Release, Europa, supra note 2.
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that territoriality had its practical – and also theoretical – limits. When
copyright management societies (even if ineptly) tried to form regional
alliances in order to develop more expeditious business models, they were
telling us that practice wants to be free of territorial constraints. Particularly
recent history is telling us that the principle of territoriality cannot act as a
barrier to commerce and innovation; that territoriality was a consequence of
the time in which copyright was born, rather than its inseparable
characteristic. Therefore, the principle needs to be reread in light of the
recent developments. Which may tell us, after all, that territoriality might
not be – or should not be, at the very least – a principle anymore.
Even if Esperanto book publishers had to get into a web of
agreements due to territoriality constraints, their activity would not be
territorial in nature; accordingly, copyrights could still be formally
territorial, but in practice their territorial component would be significantly
lessened by the way that the market operated. We could say that
territoriality was still a part of the legal system, but the concept would
basically translate its reminiscences, not its essence. Until the 21st century,
territoriality was regarded as principle because it was a part of the copyright
system modus operandi; now it has become a barrier to the system. We
should not keep talking of territoriality as a principle in those areas where
technology has created widespread distribution methods such as
downloading, methods that are borderless in nature and that are the basis of
an entire business model. The somewhat hesitant, still uncoordinated steps
that we are witnessing in Europe are the beginning of the trend towards a
demolition of territorial barriers. The law will probably get there after the
market does, but it will eventually get there – and maybe a future article on
these issues will be even called territoriality lost.
¶78

